The West Memphis 3, The Death Penalty, And What Juries Get To See And Hear

West Memphis Three.jpgThe other night I watched “Paradise Lost: The Child Murders At Robin Hood Hill.” I was spurred to watch the movie by the fact that the three men accused of the horrific murders were released on August 19, after winning the right to a new trial on appeal, and by the fact that the “Paradise Lost” documentary is critically acclaimed (ranking number twenty-four on this New York Times list of the top documentaries and ranking highly on law professor Alberto Bernabe’s list of the top legal documentaries).
After watching the documentary, I found myself agnostic about the three defendants’ actual guilt or innocence. But what I found most remarkable about the documentary was the fact that the pieces of evidence that I found most telling were from candid moments captured by the ever-present cameras, candid moments of the sort you never see when a witness is giving a formal performance on the witness stand, as well as pieces of evidence which a jury would never get to hear, due to the rules of evidence. The whole documentary made me reflect on what a little glimpse that juries get of the actual facts, of the reality of a situation.
In watching “Paradise Lost,” the most important pieces of “evidence,” from my perspective, were from moments that the jury did not see or hear and, indeed, some pieces of evidence that a judge would never let a jury see or hear. For example, as the jury was out deliberating, the documentary crew captured a scene between Jason Baldwin and his lawyer in which the lawyer asked Baldwin in effect, “Do you think that [co-defendant] Damien Echols could have done it? Do you think he was capable of killing three boys?” Baldwin, Echols’ best friend, equivocated and he said he didn’t know. For me, that was damning. The fact that someone’s best friend would not say that it would be impossible for his friend to carry out such a heinous set of acts, made me doubt the actual innocence of Echols.
Interestingly, a jury would never in a million years get to hear that admission of Baldwin’s. In a criminal case, a defendant can introduce evidence of his good character to show that he never would have committed a crime that he was accused of, but the prosecution cannot do the same: the prosecution cannot use evidence of a defendant’s character to show the defendant had a moral capacity for committing a crime. (By clicking here, you can check out Federal Rule of Evidence 404 (“Character Evidence Generally”); most states have a cognate rule of evidence).
The other pieces of “evidence” that I found most telling in the “Paradise Lost” documentary were the candid moments that the documentary crew spent with witnesses outside the courtroom. For instance, the documentary crew captured John Mark Byers, step-father of one of the victims, on a firing range, acting out fantasies of sadistic revenge against the accused murderers. Later, come trial time, the defense team unearthed some inconsistencies in Byers’ statements to police and used the inconsistencies and other facts to argue that Byers may have been involved in the boys’ murders. They called Byers to the stand, and daringly pointed the finger at him. On the witness stand, Byers presented as a meek and mild-mannered man. But the scene of him on the firing range, articulating exactly what he’d do to the accused murderers if he were to lay his hands on them – the type of candid scene where a witness lets his hair down, the type of scene that a jury never gets to see – made me think strongly that Byers might have been capable of the type of violence involved in the murders.
Perhaps the starkest example of how differently witnesses can act on the stand, when they know they are being watched, compared to their every day life came in an interview with the mother of one of the murdered boys. The woman, prior to an on-the-air news interview being commenced was all-golly-gee-I’m-going-to-be-on-TV. Rather than a bereaved mother, she looked like an excited teeny bopper feverish at the thought of having her face plastered over all of the local television sets. As the camera man counted down, “In 3-2-1,” prior to the news team’s going live, the woman’s demeanor changed completely and she became a bereaved mother. The hyper-perky publicity hound side of her personality was sickening and destructive of her credibility. But it’s something a jury would never get to see: a jury almost always sees only the public face, the mask the witness wears during the public performance of testifying.
While our process gives the jury a picture of reality that is often too small and narrow, it is also prone to errors of showing the jury too much: of allowing jurors to hear evidence that is absolutely misleading and irrelevant. “Paradise Lost” illustrated this tendency perfectly with the “expert” testimony of a correspondence school PhD in the occult who essentially was put in front of the jury to convince them that Ecchols and Baldwin were satanists and therefore murderers. Even in today’s world of Daubert and Kumho Tire, many courts abdicate their role as gatekeepers and let in charlatans as experts, without looking closely at their methodologies. The testimony of such quack experts is unfortunately all-too-common in death penalty cases. The other day the Supreme Court ordered a stay of the execution of African-American death row inmate Duane Buck, based on the fact that a psychological expert, Walter Quijano, was allowed to testify at the sentencing phase of Buck’s trial that black and Hispanic convicts are more dangerous than other convicts.
Our system’s tendency to let dangerously misleading evidence in front of jurors was also on my mind recently, as I read the news of how a suspect in a high-profile violent robbery in Woburn, MA was arrested and identified based on an unusual ankh tattoo sported by the robber. When such evidence of an unusual identifying characteristic is presented to a jury, it is normally very powerful. The jury tends to reason that, if one in a million people has such a peculiar tattoo, the odds of the defendant being the wrong man are one in a million. But in fact, this is a statistical fallacy known as “the prosecutor’s fallacy.” The actual odds of the defendant being the right man based on the tattoo are much lower: they are one in however many people out there have the same tattoo. Nevertheless, I know of no jurisdiction where a defendant can have a judge charge the jury to be wary of this fallacy. The evidence that the jury receives inevitably presents a distorted view of the world.
I came away from “Paradise Lost” nauseated by the murders and uncertain of whether Ecchols or Baldwin were involved. Even considering some of the new DNA evidence that has been unearthed in their cases, I am uncertain whether Ecchols and Baldwin are actually innocent.
I also came away convinced, more than ever, that the criminal process can never provide the certitude necessary to prevent the execution of the innocent. Juries get to see too little and too much of the reality of what happened outside the courtroom for us to presume they can render infallible verdicts.
Dahlia Lithwick had an excellent article in Slate today, pointing out how Republicans like Rick Perry are skeptics about government’s ability to do run anything – from a health care system to public works projects – but that they are absolutists when it comes to the government’s ability to discern guilt or innocence with enough certainty to kill the convicted.
But it’s not just Republicans who are prone to overrate the capacities of our judiciary. It’s also lawyers, lawyers who are so intimately familiar with the wonderful beauty of parts of our system of justice, that they believe boundlessly in our system’s capacities. It was a law professor after all, John Henry Wigmore, who famously declared that, “Cross-examination is the greatest engine for the search for truth.” When, for whatever reason, we fall prey to the idea that we can reach from the well of a courtroom to the pure reality of events that transpired outside of that courtroom, we risk the state-sanctioned murder of an innocent man.
PS: I would love to see some experts on professional responsibility, such as Professor Bernabe, give us their take on the ethics of the defense team’s allowing such unrestricted behind-the-scenes access.

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First, Let’s Deregulate All The Lawyers

kill all the lawyers.jpgIn late July, in response to a forthcoming book arguing that anyone should be able to practice law, I wrote “Should Lawyers Need Law Licenses?” in which I conceded that there was no defensible argument for laws prohibiting the “unauthorized practice of law.”
A month later, The New York Times’ editorial page caught up with me. In a staff editorial entitled “Addressing the Justice Gap,” The Times advocated for the deregulation of the legal profession, arguing that such a move would enable low income Americans to obtain legal representation.
The Times is undoubtedly correct on this score. I stand by my original post. Unlike a doctor – whose malpractice might leave you maimed or paralyzed – legal malpractice generally only results in a financial injury or loss. Thus, were we to allow anyone to practice law so long as he carried sufficient malpractice insurance, consumers would not be harmed by the entry of lesser legal practitioners into the market.
It’s probably not something we’ll see in our lifetime. But that doesn’t mean the idea is wrong.

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Legal Blog Roundup

Sorry for the light posting lately. It’s the summer news doldrums and I am gearing up for a trial. At any rate, herewith the latest from the legal blogosphere:

  • Back in June, I blogged about how missed medications cost us $250 billion a year, dwarfing the cost of medical malpractice. If we could only get everyone to take their meds as scheduled, perhaps through text messaging, I theorized, we could save about twelve percent of our annual health care tab.
    Well now FICO, the credit score agency, is going to start rating people on how compliant they are with doctor’s orders. Good patients will get high Medication Adherence Scores and bad patients will get low ratings.
    Is this a way to reap a lot of savings? Or will it simply lead to the same kinds of abuses and discrimination that law professor Frank Pasquale and others have highlighted in their criticisms of the credit rating agencies’ credit rating machinations? Stay tuned.
  • According to a new study published in the New England Journal of Medicine, only twenty percent of medical malpractice cases result in a payout to the patient. Given that medical malpractice lawsuits are incredibly expensive for plaintiff’s lawyers to bring, it is no surprise that the study’s author, Amitabh Chandra, declares, “A lawyer would have to be an idiot to bring a frivolous [medical malpractice] case to court.”

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Law Blog Roundup

  • This is one that I wish I had time to blog about. The Atlantic‘s Andrew Cohen wrote an article about a train crash in California that killed twenty-four people and seriously injured a hundred more. In 1997, Congress passed a law called the Amtrak Reform and Accountability Act that capped damages in train crashes at $200 million. Sounds great — until you have a train crash that injures over one hundred people seriously and their lifetime’s lost incomes, future medicals, etc. amount to more than $200 million. Then you have a heart-wrenching situation where a judge has to determine who gets what, potentially leaving some people without enough money to pay for their medical care.
    PointOfLaw’s Ted Frank, a tort “reform” advocate has tried to distance the tort reform movement from the mess, saying, “no reformer I know of proposes per-accident caps [on damages] or economic damages caps,” insisting that bona fide tort reformers limit themselves to caps on pain-and-suffering.
    Professor Bernabe replies here. The idea that tort reforms do not support caps on economic damages or other drastic reforms is completely risible. For instance, if you search older posts on his blog, Professor Bernabe has chronicled a nascent tort reform program: the abolition of joint-and-several liability. (A definition of joint-and-several liability can be found here). Tort reformers don’t want to limit merely economic damages. They’ve embarked on a root-and-branch campaign to make lawsuits futile to file. And if mainstream tort reformers are opposed to caps on economic damages, they’re killing us with their silence.
  • Killer Cars: An Extra 1,000 Pounds Increases Crash Fatalities By 47 Percent

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Should Lawyers Need Law Licenses?

Lawyer Requirements.jpgThere’s a new book being published by the Brookings Institution think tank that is attracting a lot of attention in the blogosphere (see here, here and here). The book, authored by Clifford Winston, Robert Crandall and Vikram Maheresi is entitled “First Thing We Do, Let’s Deregulate All The Lawyers” and its premise is simple: you shouldn’t have to go to law school, pass the bar exam or obtain a law license in order to be a lawyer. Winston, Crandall and Maheresi argue that the requirements that lawyers spend three years in law school and pass the bar exam in order to obtain a law license are merely anticompetitive measures that drive up the costs of lawyers’ services and insure that some poor people who need lawyers cannot get them.
It may make me a bit of a pariah as a lawyer, but I wholeheartedly agree.
Lawyers are rarely called upon to make a defense of the regulation of their profession, but when they do, they usually insist that the law school-and-bar exam educational complex is necessary to protect people from bad legal representation. The thinking goes that, if not for regulations mandating that lawyers attend law school and sit for a bar exam, the market would be flooded with all sorts of shysters. Regulation of lawyers is necessary to protect consumers from their own ignorance.
This is a patently bad argument. The same argument used to be trotted out by members of medieval guilds. Under the guild system, in order to sell candles you had to be a member of the chandler’s guild. In order to sell shoes, you had to be a member of the shoemaker guild, and so forth for dozens of occupations. The guilds used to insist that such restrictions on competition were necessary to insure that consumers got a product that worked. Otherwise, the thinking went, the marketplace would be flooded with candles that didn’t burn and shoddy shoes. But, eventually, these craft guilds were abolished and consumers weren’t injured. The candles continued to burn just as well and, in fact, they got cheaper. Consumers benefited.
Today of course, if I want to open a factory and manufacture candles or light bulbs, there are no regulations that I have certain training or experience. The market will sort it out.
The same result would no doubt obtain if law licensure requirements were abolished.
Yes, legal services are different from consumer goods like eyeglasses and light bulbs. A consumer who buys a pair of eyeglasses or a light bulb knows, after purchasing, if he has gotten a quality piece of merchandise. That doesn’t necessarily apply to the consumption of legal services: a lawyer knows a great deal more about the quality of his goods than the client.
But, in a de-regulated legal profession, lawyers would find a way to signal their quality. Just as Nike brand sneakers signal a particular level of quality, a Nike-branded law firm would signal a particular grade of legal representation. Moreover, third-party vendors and consumer media outlets would also provide quality assurance.
If any lawyer truly believes that the public would be harmed by incompetent legal representation in the absence of some regime of professional licensure, ask him who he thinks could do more harm to his law firm — a first-year law associate or the firm’s IT professional? The answer of course is the IT guy: with a few keystrokes, he could delete the firm’s entire file system. A first-year lawyer at the firm could never do so much damage. And the firm’s IT guy does not need to possess any credentials to hold himself out as an “IT guy.” Nevertheless, I have yet to hear of a law firm imploding due to incompetent IT personnel.
The fallback argument for many defenders of legal regulation is not that people need protection from low quality lawyers but that our system of justice requires men and women of high character to be lawyers. Any knave can be a fishmonger, the thinking goes, but lawyers occupy a position of special public trust. We at least need some barriers to entry to insure the practice of law does not devolve into a free-for-all with lawyers of bad character suborning perjury, comingling client funds with their own, and engaging in all manner of other malfeasance.
Of course, politicians occupy positions of public trust equal to or greater than the special position occupied by the average lawyers. And we don’t require politicians to pass some test before they assume office. Instead we have ethical rules that apply to their conduct once they assume office. And the same sort of regime could preserve the public trust placed in lawyers: you don’t have to pass a bar exam or a character and fitness test to get in, but once you’re in, you better play by the rules or you’ll face expulsion.
Whether lawyers like it or not, sooner or later the legal profession is going to have its entry requirements abolished. Top lawyers are now seeing their hourly rates climb to $1,000 an hour. The legal fees in the GM bankruptcy might top $1 billion. That’s real money, even at the Fortune 500 level. And when corporations feel oppressed by legal fees, they will lobby for stripping away the anticompetitive restrictions that drive up their legal bills. For lawyers contemplating what a deregulated profession will look like, it’s not a question of if, but when.

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The Casey Anthony Closing Arguments And “Temporal Variance”

Casey Anthony.jpgThis past week, over at Volokh Conspiracy, law professor Mitch Berman has been blogging about “temporal variance” in the enforcement of rules by referees and judges. The idea of “temporal variance” is well known to any sports fan, even if Berman’s phraseology is not. The idea is that, by unwritten consensus, different sets of rules are enforced at different times of contests — whether they be legal, athletic or some other kind.
Toward the end of a game, or in playoff competition, referees enforce a different set of rules than normally applies. They tend to “let the players play” and to avoid calling ticky-tack penalties.
Abiding by these unwritten rules is a part of sportsmanship and good conduct. It violates the unwritten rules of the game, whether it’s hockey or soccer, for players to flop and seek to have the referees intervene to influence the outcome of the match.
In reading through some of Berman’s blog posts on “temporal variance,” one recent, very prominent example of the “let the players play” norm being violated sprang to mind: Jose Baez’s closing argument in the Casey Anthony trial. I watched hardly any of the trial but I caught a chunk of Baez’s closing argument and, as a lawyer, took offense at the gratuitous objections made by the prosecution. The prosecution’s offense — their numerous objections, which interrupted the rhythm of Baez’s closing — was an example of temporal variance in action.
Normally in a trial, when the opposing side tries to do elicit some evidence that you think shouldn’t be allowed, you rise to your feet and announce, “Objection!” The judge/referee will then either sustain the objection or overrule you.
But in closing arguments, by unwritten rule, you don’t do that. If the other side says something you find objectionable, you wait until she finishes her closing argument, approach the bench at sidebar and ask for a limiting instruction to the jury or for your objection to be noted for the record. It’s considered truly bad form to interrupt the rhythm of someone’s closing argument to lodge an objection in open court.
Closing arguments in a trial are the ultimate playoff moment, the time of “let the players play.” There’s no rule of evidence that says a different standard applies during closing arguments, but one does.
Watching Baez’s closing argument in the Casey Anthony case, I became infuriated at the prosecution’s incessant objections on the most minor points. It truly seemed to me that the prosecution were exhibiting poor legal conduct, something analogous to the kind of poor sportsmanship implicit in a player flopping on the ground and looking for a call. But even worse, because a contest where someone’s life is at stake calls for a much higher standard of conduct than the norm.
And it seemed to me that Judge Belvin Perry did a poor of refereeing the closing. Instead of rebuking the prosecution for their petty objections, Perry carefully considered each one of the prosecution’s objections before deciding whether to sustain or overrule it. (Perhaps this is the byproduct of Florida’s elected judiciary; if we chose our referees by popular vote too, they might be wondering how their calls would be reviewed come election time).
Given the fact that prosecutors Jeff Ashton and Linda Drane Burdick seemed to give so little honor to the unwritten rules of the legal contest, it came as little surprise to learn this week that the prosecution may also have violated a legal rule graven in stone: the constitutional rule of Due Process that the prosecution turn over to the defense all exculpatory evidence in its possession. According to reports, software designer John Bradley alerted prosecutors that a key piece of evidence in the Anthony trial — the number of times that Anthony supposedly googled “chloroform” — was mistaken. There was a flaw in his software that made it seem like Anthony googled “chloroform” 84 times when in fact it had only been googled once. Yet the prosecution did not disclose Bradley’s admission of error to the defense and argued to the jury that Anthony searched “chloroform” 84 separate times.
The rules of the game might vary with time, but it seems like one’s character and sportsmanship are constants.
PS — For any lawyer who agrees that judges ought to employ some form of “temporal variance” consider the following question: it’s the middle of trial and the plaintiff has a great case on liability — unfortunately plaintiff’s only viable claims are outside the scope of the complaint. Should a judge allow an amendment freely in the middle of trial? Or should the judge deny any motion to amend the complaint?
It might seem that allowing the amendment would most embody the “let the players play” ethos: it would allow the contest to be determined by a good old-fashioned slugfest in front of the jury. On the other hand, in this type of situation, it’s hard to think of a call that would more clearly involve the judge placing his or her thumb on the scales to influence the outcome.

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Link Roundup

  • An entire issue of the Spine Journal is devoted to conflicts of interest in Medtronic-funded studies; furor may force Medtronic to sell off its spinal device business.
  • Professor Bernabe on why we don’t need the learned intermediary doctrine. More Bernabe here, on the absurdity of statutes of repose in medical malpractice cases.

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It Is A Level Regulatory Playing Field

football_field-963.jpgAs The Pop Tort blog reminds us, the US Chamber of Commerce is once again banging the drum of how overregulation and American litigiousness are supposedly hurting businesses’ competitiveness. It’s a familiar refrain.
We’ve heard it before from businesses large and small: if only the lawyers would get off our backs, we’d be world class competitors!
Granted we’ve seen an explosion in government regulation in the past century or so. And Americans, much as they despise lawyers as a class, are not lawsuit averse.
But what is missing from the tort reformers’ arguments are any explanation of how America’s legal landscape hurts the competitiveness of American businesses. It’s a level regulatory playing field. The same regulations that apply to American businesses apply to Chinese businesses or German businesses doing business in the United States.
It’s no more legal for a Chinese manufacturer to sell toys with lead paint than it is for an American toy company to do so. The cost of such a regulation affects Chinese manufacturers the same way it affects American manufacturers. It’s a level regulatory playing field.
As Toyota can tell you, as it fends off dozens of Sudden Uncontrolled Acceleration (“SUA”) lawsuits for defects in its cars, American law applies to other foreign corporations too. It’s a level regulatory playing field, which is something the tort reformers would like you to forget as they throw a pity party for American businessmen.
Granted, Chinese companies might not have to contend with some of the OSHA and EPA regulations that American companies do. But Americans also enjoy a greater quality-of-life because of those laws and regulations.
And the level of American regulation pales in comparison to some very competitive countries. You don’t hear Mercedes-Benz complaining, “We can’t compete; we have to give health care and paid vacation to our workers!”
The next time you hear some tort reformer bemoaning the effect that our legal system has on the competitiveness of American companies, remember this: Tort reform is just the excuse of failing and struggling businesses.

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Friday Link Roundup

  • Professor Bernabe reports on the first “popcorn lung” jury verdict.
  • The Chicago Tribune reports on the skyrocketing (no pun intended) rates of injuries at the latest entertainment phenomenon: trampoline parks. Meanwhile, the new Sky Zone park probably rates as one of Boston’s hottest new suburban attractions. I’ve yet to have the chance to visit.
  • A wrongful death lawsuit is filed in the gruesome escalator accident that killed a four-year old boy at the Auburn Mall. The “accident” (it is hard to call such gross negligence an accident) led to investigations that showed how many of the Commonwealth’s escalators do not comply with safety regulations.

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